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1. 
Introduction 
  
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, “it means just what I choose it to mean- neither 
more nor less.” 
“The question is,” says Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different 
things.” 
 
“The question is-” said Humpty, “which is to be master- that’s all.” 1 
 Humpty’s wisdom would have made him uniquely prepared for the extraordinary 
events of June 28, 2012. The United States had waited breathlessly as the Supreme Court 
considered the future of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.2 As the Court 
announced its decision in National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius from the 
bench, reporters were handed a copy of the voluminous 187 page opinion.3 Combing 
feverishly through the document, newsmen raced to discover whether President Barack 
Obama’s signature legislative achievement was alive or dead. Scanning to page thirty of the 
opinion, major news outlets instantly seized upon Chief Justice’s Roberts’ statement that the 
centerpiece of the Affordable Care Act, the individual requirement to own health insurance, 
was not a valid exercise of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.4 CNN and Fox News 
splashed banners across millions of television screens announcing that the Supreme Court 
had struck down the cornerstone of the Act.5 Even President Obama, who did not have 
advance warning of Court’s decision, saw the reports.6 Humpty’s wisdom would have been a 
                                                          
1 Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through The Looking Glass (Oxford, 1982) 190 
2 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Public Law 111-148 
3 National Federation of Independent Business  v Sebelius  (2012) 132 S Ct 1366 
4 Ibid 
5 Chenda Ngak, ‘Getting It Wrong: Media Rushes to Report on Supreme Court’s Healthcare Decision’ (CBS 
News, 28 June 2012) <http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-501465_162-57462787-501465/getting-it-wrong-media-
rushes-to-report-on-supreme-courts-health-care-decision/> accessed June 13, 2013 
6 Chuck Todd, Shawna Thomas, and Domenico Montanaro, ‘Obama Initially Thought Mandate Had Been 
Struck Down’ (NBC News, June 28, 2012) <http://firstread.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/06/28/12463066-obama-
initially-thought-mandate-had-been-struck-down> accessed June 13, 2013  
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revelation at this moment. Had they merely turned the page, reporters would have been 
caught immediately by the Chief Justice’s fateful declaration, emphasizing “that is not the 
end of the matter.” 7  
 General consensus in the run up to the decision in NFIB v Sebelius expected it to be a 
landmark case.8 The Affordable Care Act, passed by Congress in 2010, sought to build upon 
four decades of incremental healthcare reform, alleviating issues in access, financing, and 
preventive care that had caused healthcare costs to explode to 16% of the United States’ 
Gross National Product (GNP) by 2008.9 The scale of this problem drove Congress and 
President Obama to seek unique policy solutions, such as the individual mandate.10 This 
legislation sharply divided the country and brought about a flood of litigation. Most notably, 
twenty-six states jointly challenged Congress’ authority to enact the individual mandate 
under the Commerce Clause in Federal courts, renewing the ongoing constitutional debate 
surrounding Congress’ enumerated Article I powers.11 
 In considering the fate of the Act, the Supreme Court was presented with normally 
conclusive statements of Congressional intent through legislative findings, statements, and 
rejected proposals, each attesting to the construction of the minimum coverage provision as a 
Commerce Clause regulation and penalty. Though facially unconstitutional under this 
justification, in the end, the Supreme Court declared that the minimum coverage provision 
could be upheld alternatively as a tax. The implications of this holding, focused on 
Congressional intent and the resulting separation of powers consequences will be the primary 
focus of this work. 
                                                          
7 n 3 
8 N C Aizenman, ‘Opponents Present Case Against Obama’s Healthcare Law in 20-State Lawsuit’ (Washington 
Post, September 14, 2010) < http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/09/14/AR2010091402458.html> accessed June 13, 2013 
9 ---------------- ‘Growth in Healthcare Costs’ (Congressional Budget Office, January 31, 2008)  
<http://www.cbo.gov/publication/41666> accessed June 13, 2013 
10 n 2, §1501 
11 Art. I, US Constitution; Five other major cases were also litigated and will be discussed sporadically. 
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2. 
Overview 
Importance of the Key Issues 
 The methods used to interpret and give effect to statutes are one of the most impactful 
elements of our political system. In a similar vein, the volume of statutory law has exploded 
over the last century in the United States.12 Noting that we live in an “age of statutes,” Justice 
Frankfurter commented that “courts have ceased to be the primary makers of law in the sense 
in which they ‘legislated’ the common law… it is certainly true of the Supreme Court that 
almost every case has a statute at its heart or close to it.” 13 Sixty years on, courts’ 
interpretation and application of legislation has simultaneously become both more complex 
and decisive. A critical examination of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Affordable 
Care Act’s minimum coverage provision allows us to assess whether Congress’ initial 
construction of the statute was effectuated, the primary role of courts in statutory 
interpretation.14  
The soundness of statutory interpretive methodology is crucial as one of the primary 
bulwarks of separation of powers. Lawmaking is the exclusive responsibility of the 
legislative branch. Similarly, the judiciary, after the drafting of the Constitution, quickly 
assumed the role of interpretation and review.15 Consequently, statutory interpretation must 
affirm the respective roles of these institutions, allowing an effective defense against 
                                                          
12 Jesse M Barrett, ‘Legislative History’ (1997-1998) 73 Notre Dame LR 822 
13 Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (Harvard, 1982); Felix Frankfurter, ‘Some 
Reflections on the Reading of Statutes’ (1947) 47 Columbia LR 527 
14 Ibid Frankfurter, 529 
15 Marbury v Madison (1803) 1803 WL 893; Judicial review is not mentioned expressly in the Constitution, this 
power is commonly viewed as having been assumed in Marbury, however, a number of the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in the 1790s underscored this authority. 
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improper encroachment, preventing legislation outside the constitutional process, and 
promoting a healthy legislative-judicial partnership.16 
Methodology 
 The policy setting and legislative history of the Affordable Care Act will be outlined 
initially in order to provide context. Litigation challenging the Affordable Care Act’s 
constitutionality will then be explored and later contrasted with legislative intent. 
This work proceeds from Justice Frankfurter’s conclusion that the primary role of 
courts in statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent.17 Elements of statutory 
interpretation- legislative findings, materials and statements, and rejected proposals- will first 
be explored in depth in order to fully develop the meaning of legislative intent. These 
important building blocks will then be compared to the text of the Affordable Care Act as 
evidence establishing Congressional intent. This conclusion of legislative purpose will then 
be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s holding in NFIB v Sebelius. This is necessarily 
crucial. Interpretive methodologies must be scrutinized carefully to ensure each element of 
legislative intent, when clear, is accounted for and brought to life in decisions from the bench.  
Finally, judicial revision and the resulting consequences under the separation of 
powers will be explored. This work contends that through clear evidence of legislative intent, 
the United States Congress intended the Affordable Care Act’s minimum coverage provision 
to be a Commerce Clause regulation, and through the Supreme Court’s impermissible 
revision of this statute, Congress’ function in the separation of powers has been placed at 
risk. 
 
 
                                                          
16 Linda D Jellum, ‘“Which Is To Be Master,” The Judiciary or the Legislature? When Statutory Directives 
Violate Separation of Powers’ (2008-2009) 56 UCLA LJ 872 
17 n 13 
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3. 
The Legislative History of the Affordable Care Act 
Policy Setting 
 The United States Constitution does not establish a right to healthcare or other social 
programs and benefits.18 Foundationally, the framers of the Constitution were more 
concerned with the framework restricting the powers of government to areas of absolute 
necessity, such as interstate commerce and defense.19 Consequently, healthcare is broadly 
privately sourced, with a majority of Americans obtaining health insurance through their 
employer.20 Three major exceptions have been established by Congress in order to facilitate 
coverage for vulnerable groups: 
x Medicare (1965): Federally funded and administered insurance program 
covering persons over age 65 and the disabled. 
x Medicaid (1965): Joint Federal-state insurance program for low-income 
parents, children, the elderly, and disabled. 
x State Children’s Health Insurance Program (1997): Joint Federal-state 
program for children whose parents exceed the Medicaid income threshold 
but cannot afford insurance.21 
In spite of these programs, an estimated 51 million Americans, especially lower-
income adults, did not have health insurance in 2008, contributing to an estimated $56 billion 
in uncompensated care by providers.22 Five percent of the country’s population accounted for 
half of all healthcare spending in 2007.23 Considering these factors, it is unsurprising that 
costs have increased sharply, from around 5% of GNP in 1965, to 16% in 2008, with 
                                                          
18 n 11; Kathleen S Swendiman, Healthcare: Constitutional Rights and Legislative Powers (Congressional 
Research Service, 2010) 1  
19 Ibid Swendiman 
20 Bernadette Fernandez, Health Insurance: A Primer (Congressional Research Service, 2011) 11-12 
21 Ibid; These programs are voluntary in the sense that participation is not mandatory, and in the case of 
Medicaid and the State Children’s Program are not funded with an independent tax. 
22 Ibid 8 
23 Ibid 2 
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projections predicting this number to double to 32% by 2032.24 In order to control these 
staggering rises, many experts claimed that the national risk pool for health insurance needed 
to be broadened, with more individuals contributing to healthcare costs through private 
insurance plans, lowering the effects of uncompensated care.25    
 Two major policy alternatives competed to address this issue: tax incentives and 
mandated coverage. Tax incentives would allow both individuals and employers to deduct 
premium costs from their income and employment taxes, with additional benefits for health 
savings accounts.26 Conversely, mandated coverage proponents sought to broaden the risk 
pool by legally requiring coverage and subsidizing purchase for lower-income individuals 
and families.27  
In 1993, Congressional Democrats and President Bill Clinton introduced the “Health 
Security Act,” legislation designed to enact a comprehensive Federal regulatory framework 
of the national health insurance market.28 This bill mandated the universal purchase of 
insurance and prohibited disenrollment until alternative coverage was obtained.29 A civil 
penalty enforced this requirement.30 Criticism from all sides of the political spectrum meant 
that the legislation ultimately failed to pass.31  
Healthcare reform then stalled broadly until 2006, when the Massachusetts General 
Assembly, at the urging of Governor Mitt Romney, enacted sweeping legislation that 
required the purchase of health insurance for the first time nationally.32 Two years later, 
healthcare reform played a major, but secondary role in the 2008 presidential campaign. 
                                                          
24 n 9; These projections occurred before the Affordable Care Act’s passage. 
25 n 21, 3 
26 Jennifer Jenson and Bernadette Fernandez, Health Insurance Basics (Congressional Research Service, 2007)  
5 
27 Scott E Harrington, ‘The Health Insurance Reform Debate’ (2010) 77 J of Risk & Insurance 16 
28 HR 3600 (1993) 
29 Ibid §1002  
30 Ibid §1323 (i) 
31 Mark E Rushefsky and Kant Patel, Politics, Power, and Policy Making: The Case of Healthcare Reform in the 
1990s (Sharpe, 1998) 107-108 
32 Michael T Doonan and Katherine R Tull, ‘Healthcare Reform in Massachusetts’ (2010) 88 The Milbank 
Quarterly 56 
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Senator John McCain favored increased tax incentives of $2,500 for individuals and $5,000 
for families, as well as introducing a ‘Guaranteed Access Plan’ for individuals with 
disqualifying preexisting conditions.33 Senator Barack Obama’s competing plan at that time 
emphasized universal healthcare, establishing a government-run public option to compete in 
the insurance market with private plans, but neither garnered much attention because of the 
2008 financial crisis.34 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
 After the immediate threat of economic collapse abated, newly elected President 
Barack Obama turned toward healthcare reform in mid-2009. Senator Max Baucus 
(Democrat, Montana) took the leading role in formulating the healthcare reform proposal in 
Congress as Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee.35 Many Members of Congress 
introduced competing proposals around this time, but they can be broadly classified into three 
categories: 
x Single-Payer: Replace existing coverage with a mandatory government health 
insurance program.36 
x Incentivize Private Coverage: Broad tax incentives for private insurance.37 
x Expanded Private and Public Options: Mandated purchase to enlarge the risk 
pool and reduce costs, tax incentives, and an expansion of eligibility for 
Medicaid to lower-income adults.38 
                                                          
33 Robert E Moffitt and Nina Owcharenko, ‘The McCain Health Plan: More Power to Families’ (Heritage 
Foundation, 2008) <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/10/the-mccain-health-care-plan-more-
power-to-families> accessed June 14, 2013 
34 -------------- ‘Remarks of Senator Barack Obama’ (NY Times, May 29, 2007)  
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/29/us/politics/28text-obama.html> accessed June 14, 2013 
35 Karen Tumulty, ‘Max Baucus Is Mr. Healthcare’ (Time, March 26, 2009) 
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1887843,00.html> accessed June 14, 2013 
36 HR 15, National Health Insurance Act (2009); HR 1200/S.703, The American Health Security Act of 2009; 
HR 2399, The American Health Benefits Program Act (2009) 
37 HR 198, Healthcare Tax Deduction Act of 2009; HR 879 Affordable Healthcare Expansion Act of 2009; 
S.207, Health Insurance Tax Relief Act (2009) 
38 HR 3200, America’s Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009; HR 3962, Affordable Healthcare for America 
Act (2009); HR 3590, Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; S.1796, America’s Healthy Future Act of 
2009 
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The nature of Congress’ legislative bargain means that compromise is a de facto 
requirement for passage.39 Diffusion of power among committee chairmen and individual 
members, weak party discipline, a broad right of introduction, the filibuster, and presidential 
veto are Congressional watchwords.40 Understanding these factors, the third option began to 
garner the most support during extensive Congressional hearings in 2009. The House of 
Representatives passed HR 3962, The Affordable Healthcare for America Act, on November 
7 of that year.41 Similarly, the Senate combined two proposals by the Health, Education, 
Labor, and Pensions Committee (S. 1679) and Senator Baucus’ Finance Committee (S. 
1796), into a single vehicle by amending HR 3590, then a tax relief bill for military 
members.42 The Senate passed the amended HR 3590, now entitled the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, on December 24, 2009 by a 60-39 vote, overcoming a potential 
filibuster by one vote.43 Each of these three pieces of legislation included an individual 
requirement to maintain health insurance, and a monetary imposition for failing to do so, the 
so-called “minimum coverage provision.” 44  
 Senator Ted Kennedy (Democrat, Massachusetts) died after a months-long battle with 
cancer in August 2009. As a result, one Senate seat was vacant during the December 24 vote, 
and Senate Democrats were able to overcome the sixty vote threshold needed to end debate 
and avoid a Republican filibuster. However, Scott Brown (Republican, Massachusetts), was 
chosen in a special election on January 19, 2010, and the Act was in significant danger of 
failure. That was because the House, though controlled by Democrats, initially refused to 
                                                          
39 See generally, Graham K Wilson, ‘Congress in Comparative Perspective’ 89 Boston Univ LR 835; McKay 
and Charles Johnson, Parliament & Congress (Oxford, 2012)  
40 Ibid 
41 n 39 
42 Ibid; Interestingly, HR 3590 is an example of how the Senate escapes the Origination Clause of the US 
Constitution. With no germanity requirement, the Senate can attach new taxation proposals to unrelated House 
revenue legislation. HR 3590 was previously entitled the ‘Service Members Home Ownership Tax Act of 2009’ 
43 ‘Roll Call 396’ (US Senate, December 24, 2009) 
<http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&session=1&vote=
00396> accessed June 14, 2013 
44 n 39 
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agree to the same text of HR 3590, a constitutional requirement.45 Lamenting that “the Senate 
bill clearly is better than nothing,” House Democrats agreed to accept the Senate bill, making 
separate amendments via a special budgetary process called reconciliation, which required a 
new piece of legislation, but only a simple majority in the Senate.46  
The House approved the Senate’s Affordable Care Act and the reconciliation bill, HR 
4872 by a 219-212 vote, with 34 Democrats and all 178 Republicans voting against.47 
President Obama signed the Affordable Care Act into law on March 23.48 Healthcare reform 
was seemingly complete after the Senate approved the reconciliation bill and the President 
signed it days later.49 The lynchpin of this legislation, §5000(a) set off a flurry of litigation 
challenging its constitutionality: 
 “SEC. 5000A. Requirement to Maintain Minimum Essential Coverage. 
(a) Requirement to Maintain Minimum Essential Coverage. – An applicable individual shall 
for each month beginning after 2013 ensure that the individual, and any dependent of the 
individual who is an applicable individual, is covered under minimum essential coverage 
for such month. 
(b) Shared Responsibility Payment.- 
(1) In General.- If an applicable individual fails to meet the requirement of 
subsection (a) for 1 or more months during any calendar year beginning after 
2013, then, except as provided in subsection (d), there is hereby imposed a 
penalty with respect to the individual in the amount determined under  
subsection (c).” 50 
 
                                                          
45 Janet Adami and Naftali Bendavid, ‘Democrats Ponder Triage on Healthcare’ (Wall Street Journal, January 
19, 2010) <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704561004575013550592114376.html> accessed 
June 14, 2013 
46 Carrie Budoff Brown and Patrick O’Connor, ‘No Easy Rescue Plan for Healthcare’ (Politico, January 18, 
2010)< http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0110/31635.html> accessed June 14, 2013; Robert Keith and Bill 
Hennith Jr, The Budget Reconciliation Process: House and Senate Procedures (Congressional Research 
Service, 2005)  
47 ‘Roll Call 165’ (US House of Representatives, March 21, 2010)  
<http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2010/roll165.xml> accessed June 15, 2013 
48 Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Robert Pear, ‘Obama Signs Healthcare Overhaul Bill, With a Flourish’ (NY Times, 
March 23, 2010) < http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/health/policy/24health.html> accessed June 15, 2013 
49Associated Press, ‘Obama Signs Healthcare Reconciliation Bill’ (Seattle Times, March 30, 2010) 
<http://seattletimes.com/html/politics/2011476026_apusobamapreview.html> accessed June 15, 2013 
50 n 2 
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4. 
“The Most Significant Case of My Lifetime” 51 
Litigation 
 The words of Florida Attorney General Bill McCollum underscore the constitutional 
issues that surrounded the Affordable Care Act. On March 23, 2010, literally moments after 
President Obama signed the Act into law, McCollum and twelve other state attorneys-general 
filed an action in Federal district court challenging the constitutionality of the minimum 
coverage provision.52 This case and each of the five other constitutional challenges that were 
filed in other Federal courts considered all, or part, of the following issues: 
x Anti-Injunction Act: Applicability of an 1867 law prohibiting Federal courts, 
with exceptions, from considering Federal tax cases until the taxes have been 
collected under protest 53 
x Constitutionality of the minimum coverage provision 54 
x Constitutionality of the Medicaid expansion: Whether Congress’ expansion of 
the Medicaid program represented coercion of the states 55 
x Severability of the minimum coverage provision 56 
In his January 2011 ruling, Senior District Judge Roger Vinson held that Congress’ 
enactment of the individual mandate under the Commerce Clause was not constitutionally 
authorized.57 Accepting the government’s contention that the mandate was “necessary” and 
“essential” for the legislation to operate as intended by Congress, Judge Vinson declined to 
                                                          
51 n 8 
52 ‘Complaint’ (Florida v Dept of Health and Human Services) 2010 WL 1038209 (Northern District of Florida) 
53 26 USC §7421 (a); Florida v Dept of Health and Human Services (2011) 780 F Supp 2d 1256 (Northern 
District of Florida); Florida v Dept of Health and Human Services (2011) 648 F 3d 1235 (Eleventh Circuit); 
Thomas More v Obama (2010) 720 F Supp 2d 882 (Eastern District of Michigan); Thomas More v Obama 
(2011) 651 F 3d 529 (Sixth Circuit); Liberty University v Geithner (2010) 753 F Supp 2d 611 (Western District 
of Virginia); Mead v Holder (2011) 766 F Supp 2d 16 (District of Columbia); Liberty University v Geithner 
(2011) 671 F 3d 691 (Fourth Circuit); Seven-Sky v Holder (2011) 661 F 3d 1 (DC Circuit); n 3 
54 Ibid Florida, Thomas More, Liberty University, Mead, Seven-Sky 
55 Ibid Florida 
56 Ibid; Virginia v. Sebelius (2010) 702 F Supp 2d 598 (Eastern District of Virginia) 
57 Ibid Florida (Northern District of Florida) 
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sever the mandate, holding “the entire Act must be declared void.” 58 Before this ruling, many 
legal commentators believed that the Supreme Court would eventually find the mandate 
constitutional by a significant majority.59 In the aftermath of Judge Vinson’s “extremely 
deep...discussion of principles and constitutional doctrine,” however, commentators began to 
recognize that the eventual Supreme Court decision would be complex and split the court 
closely. On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, the Court upheld Judge Vinson’s ruling that the 
mandate was unconstitutional, but severed it from remainder of the Act.60 
 Similarly, five other major lawsuits were considered in 2010-2011. Federal trial and 
appellate courts in Virginia, Michigan, and the District of Columbia issued a range of 
decisions, some finding the mandate constitutional, others unconstitutional, with others 
holding that standing did not exist because of the Anti-Injunction Act.61 Resolving 
disagreement between lower courts on points of law is one of the most important functions of 
the United States Supreme Court.62 As a result, the Court decided to grant certiorari to the 
Florida case and cross-appeals (NFIB)  from the Eleventh Circuit on November 14, 2011, 
scheduling a record five and a half hours of oral argument over three days in March 2012.63 
 
 
 
                                                          
58 Ibid 
59 Alexander Bolton, ‘Lawmakers Press Supreme Court for Decision on Healthcare Law’ (The Hill, February 2, 
2011) <http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/141631-lawmakers-press-court-for-verdict> accessed June 
15, 2013 
60 n 54, Florida (Eleventh Circuit) 
61 n 54, Thomas More, Liberty, Mead, Seven-Sky; n 57 
62 Edward T Roehner and Sheila M Roehner, ‘Certiorari- What is a Conflict Between Circuits?’ (1952-1953) 20 
Univ of Chicago LR 656 
63 ‘Grant of Certiorari’ (US Supreme Court, November 14, 2011) 
<http://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/PDFs/111411zr.pdf> accessed June 15, 2013; By this time, a total of 
twenty-five states had joined Florida as parties to this case. Certioriari is a commonly used writ used by United 
States courts to review lower decisions on matters of law. 
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The System of Enumerated Powers 
 
“We start with first principles. The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated 
powers.”  
       -Chief Justice William Rehnquist, United States v Lopez 64 
  
A discussion of the issues surrounding Congress’ enumerated legislative powers is 
necessary to understand the issues surrounding the minimum coverage provision. The 
Framers created the Constitution to fundamentally restrict the powers of the Federal 
government, while at the same time allowing it to be effective in a few specifically defined 
areas. The Framers’ desire to place strict boundaries on the newborn government resulted 
from their experiences with the plenary powers of the British parliament and colonial 
officials in the years prior to the revolution.65 Similarly, however, they sought to provide an 
effective, capable government in the areas in which they delegated authority, knowing full 
well the funding issues experienced by the national ‘government’ under the Articles of 
Confederation.66  
Affirming the notion that “the powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the 
Federal government are few and defined” and “those which are to remain in the State 
governments are numerous and indefinite,” the Constitution establishes distinct areas in 
which Congress may act.67 Article I, §VIII states that Congress may:  
x “Constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme court” 
x “Raise and support armies” 
x “Regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states” 
x “Lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises” 
                                                          
64 (1995) 514 US 549 
65 Alison L LaCroix, ‘What If Madison Had Won? Imagining a Constitutional World of Legislative Supremacy’ 
(2011-2012) 45 Indiana LR 41; Plenary authority, or the police power, is general legislative authority to regulate 
any area of human conduct. The individual states are the holders of the police power in our constitutional 
framework, whereas the British Parliament, and many other unitary states’ national legislatures possess this 
power. Enumeration is a facet of federal systems. 
66 Ibid 43 
67 James Madison, ‘Federalist No 45’ (Independent Journal, 1788)  
<http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fed_45.html> accessed June 17, 2013 
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x “Make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
Execution the foregoing Powers.” 68  
The simple act of enumerating authority prohibits Congress from exercising powers 
not expressly listed.69 As a result, unlike many legislative bodies worldwide, Congress does 
not possess a constitutional “police power.” 70  This is the basis on which the Affordable Care 
Act was challenged in Federal courts, that Congress improperly departed from its enumerated 
powers in enacting the minimum coverage provision, specifically in the context of its 
authority to “regulate commerce with…the several states” and to “lay and collect Taxes.” 71   
The Commerce Clause 
 In many scenarios, it is often the simple things that you dismiss as harmless that end 
up causing the most trouble. The Constitution is no exception. Madison, in ‘Federalist 45’, 
noted that “the regulation of commerce, it is true, is a new power; but that seems to be an 
addition which few oppose, and from which no apprehensions are entertained.” 72 Madison’s 
judgment of the Commerce authority in Article I would seem to underscore the narrow 
original intent of this power as limited to removing barriers to effective commerce between 
the states. However, the Congress’ use of the Commerce Clause as the basis of legislation has 
not remained within this limited, original role.  
In the midst of severe economic depression, Congress passed the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act in 1938 in order to control national wheat prices.73 The Supreme Court later 
found that Congress could penalize farmers for growing wheat in excess of their quota for 
solely private use under the Commerce Clause.74 In this case, Congress expanded its 
authority under the Commerce Clause to its greatest historical extent, regulating indirect 
                                                          
68 n 11 
69 Gil Seinfeld, ‘Article I, Article III, and the Limits of Enumeration’ (2009-2010) 108 Michigan LR 1394 
70 Benjamin D Barros, ‘The Police Power and the Takings Clause’ (2003-2004) 58 Univ of Miami LR 474 
71 n 11, §VIII 
72 n 68 
73 7 USC §1281, 1340 
74 Wickard v. Filburn (1942) 317 US 111 
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individual commerce behavior in light of their national, aggregated effects- establishing, at 
the time, that the Commerce Clause had no outer boundary.75  
The Gun-Free School Zones Act would change all of this.76 In 1995, Congress passed 
a statute prohibiting firearms in schools.77 Government advocates argued that Congress 
enacted the statute as an exercise of its Commerce authority because of the effect of school 
violence on education, and the effects education has on the economy.78 The Supreme Court 
rejected this long-standing view of the Commerce Clause as a limitless instrument in United 
States v Lopez, noting that the delegation of a specific commerce power to regulate “among 
the Several states” implies that the Commerce power has an outer boundary and that direct 
“substantial effects” on commerce or the economy must be shown in order to exercise this 
authority.79 However, in spite of this, every case that the Court had considered in its 225 year 
history before NFIB was about the regulation of commercial activity; no precedent existed on 
the compulsion of private commercial activity by the government. As a result, a genuine issue 
of first impression existed. 
The Commerce Power and the Minimum Coverage Provision 
In its opinion, the Supreme Court noted that “legislative novelty is not necessarily 
fatal,” but that sometimes “‘the most telling indication of [a] severe constitutional 
problem…is the lack of historical precedent.’” 80 Neither side in the litigation disputed the 
premise that the health insurance market was commerce and could be regulated under the 
                                                          
75 Ibid; See also United States v Darby (1941) 312 US 100; In that way, it could be argued at that time that the 
Commerce Clause had become a de facto police power. 
76 n 65 
77 18 USC §922 (g) 
78 n 65 
79 Ibid; See also United States v Morrison (2000) 528 US 598 
80 n 3, citing Free Enterprise Fund v Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (2010) 130 S Ct 3138 
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Commerce Clause, but disputed the constitutionality of the mandated purchase found in the 
minimum coverage provision.81  
The Court held that previous Commerce Clause doctrine established voluntary 
commercial activity as the predicate to Congress’ legislative authority, accepting the States’ 
argument.82 The Court stated that “the power to regulate commerce presupposes the 
existence of commercial activity to be regulated.” 83 The Court offered the example that 
extending legislative power to include the creation of activity would theoretically authorize a 
mandatory purchase to solve every policy problem and represent the general police power the 
Constitution had sought to avoid.84  Most importantly, the Court recognized that the very 
doctrine of enumerated powers logically presupposes an outer limit to Congressional 
jurisdiction.85 Believing that the individual mandate “would open a new and potentially vast 
domain” of Congressional authority, “carrying us from the notion of a government of limited 
powers,” the Court held that the mandate could not be sustained as a regulation of 
commercial activity.86  
The Taxing Power 
Another of Congress’ enumerated powers is the ability to “Lay and collect Taxes, 
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and 
general Welfare of the United States.” 87 The Clause, important from the Framers’ viewpoint 
because of their inability to fund government operations under the Articles of Confederation, 
                                                          
81 ‘Brief for Petitioners (Minimum Coverage Provision)’ (Dept of Health and Human Services v Florida) 2012 
WL 37168; ‘Brief for Respondents (Minimum Coverage Provision)’ (Dept of Health and Human Services v 
Florida) 2012 WL 392550; The difference in case names results from cross-appeals. 
82 n 3 
83 Ibid 
84 ‘Transcript of Oral Argument’ (Department of Health and Human Services v State of Florida) WL 1017220; 
Justice Scalia’s observation that this doctrine could enable a requirement to purchase broccoli in order to 
promote healthier lifestyles and lower healthcare costs underscores this conclusion. 
85 n 3 
86 Ibid 
87 n 11, §VIII, Cl. III 
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is very broad, owing to the “common Defense and general welfare” provision.88 Congress is 
also not limited to appropriation in the areas covered by the other enumerated powers- it may 
spend money toward any object that provides for the common defense and general welfare of 
the country.89 South Dakota v Dole (1987) centered on Congressional appropriation of 
Federal highway funds, with the proviso that states raise their legal drinking ages to 21.90  
The Supreme Court upheld these conditions and the legislative aim.91  
Similarly, taxes are most naturally thought of as levies producing revenue to fund the 
operations of government.92 However, these instruments must also be seen in light of 
incentivizing conduct and their tangential regulatory aim. McCulloch v Maryland (1819) 
established the broad nature of the taxing power, holding that this discretion may be extended 
to “every object brought within its [government’s] jurisdiction,” and most famously, “that the 
power to tax involves the power to destroy,” but noting that “to carry this to the excess of 
destruction would be an abuse.” 93 Noting that “every tax is in some measure regulatory,” the 
Court recognized that taxes impose “an economic impediment to the activity taxed as 
compared with others not taxed.” 94 In this way, Congress may use tax policy to incentivize 
conduct that it cannot regulate through its specific regulatory powers. Understanding these 
grants of authority, Congress may not enact a tax that is “verbal cellophane,” a levy that goes 
beyond encouraging conduct to such an extent that “it loses its character…and becomes a 
mere penalty with the characteristics of regulation and punishment.” 95 In that way, there is a 
clear distinction between taxes and penalties as distinct instruments of policy. 
 
                                                          
88 Gale Ann Norton, ‘The Limitless Federal Taxing Power’ (1985) 8 Harvard J on L & Public Policy 591 
89 Ibid 
90 South Dakota v Dole (1987) 483 US 203 
91 Ibid 
92 G Merle Bergman, ‘The Federal Power to Tax and Spend’ (1946-1947) 31 Minnesota LR 330 
93 McCulloch v Maryland (1819) 100 US 1 
94 Ibid; Sonzinsky v United States (1937) 300 US 506 
95 Child Labor Tax Cases (1922) 259 US 20; Justice Jackson states in his concurrence that “It will be a sad day 
for the revenues if the good will of the people toward their taxing system is frittered away in efforts to 
accomplish by taxation moral reforms that cannot be accomplished by direct legislation.” 
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“That Is Not the End of the Matter” 
 A legal “not so fast,” these words underscored the Supreme Court’s surprising 
decision. The taxing power had been a backwater of the healthcare litigation from the 
beginning. No court had held the mandate to be an exercise of the taxing power, even though 
some judges had considered it in detail and rejected it.96 Of the two hours spent before the 
Court in oral arguments on the minimum coverage provision, an inexplicably trivial 54 words 
were devoted to the tax argument.97 Having seen the Commerce Clause argument rejected by 
the Supreme Court, this is perhaps the reason why CNN and Fox made a grievous error in 
initially reporting the Court’s decision. Consequently, no one expected the Court to turn to 
the taxing power to rescue the legislation, and yet that is exactly what happened. 
  Writing for the majority in a fractious 5-4 opinion, Chief Justice Roberts based the 
decision to read the minimum coverage provision as a tax on the following elements: 98 
x The minimum coverage provision’s penalty is paid into the Treasury by 
applicable taxpayers when they file their annual tax return.99 
x The level of the exaction is determined by “familiar factors” such as taxable 
income, dependents, and marital status.100 
x The provision is administered by the Internal Revenue Service, “in the same 
manner as taxes.” 101 
The opinion declares that “if a statute has more than one possible meaning, one 
unconstitutional, courts should adopt the meaning that is constitutional.” 102 This paradigm 
seeks to articulate the substantial deference and presumption of constitutionality that courts 
                                                          
96 See n 54, Sutton, J (dissenting), Thomas More Law Center v Obama (Sixth Circuit); Davis, J (dissenting) 
Liberty University v Geithner (Fourth Circuit); Florida v Dept of Health and Human Services (Eleventh 
Circuit); n 57 
97 n 85 
98 Importantly, the Chief Justice wrote the central portion of the opinion. While Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, 
Kagan, and Sotomayor voted to uphold the constitutionality of the minimum coverage provision, they did not 
join in Chief Justice Roberts’ reasoning to hold it as a tax. 
99 n 3 
100 Ibid 
101 Ibid 
102 Ibid 
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employ in statutory interpretation.103 Courts have long assumed statutes that come before 
them on review are constitutional, and rightly so, because the judiciary is not the principal 
lawmaking organ of government.104 This places a burden on the plaintiffs in an action to 
prove that the statute is “unavoidably” defective.105  
The Court uses the three specific characteristics outlined above to move the 
Affordable Care Act from facial unconstitutionality as drafted, to constitutional safety under 
the taxing power. These facets, while tangentially supportive of the Court’s reasoning, do not 
even approach the level of a dispositive conclusion. As will be shown, the statute was 
“unavoidably” defective from its initial passage as a Commerce Clause regulation, with the 
Court’s reasoning setting aside three foundational principles of statutory interpretation, 
legislative findings, materials and statements, and rejected proposals, departing from our 
understanding  of separation of powers. 106 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
103 Andrew F Hessick, ‘Rethinking the Presumption of Constitutionality’ (2009-2010) 85 Notre Dame LR 1448 
104 Spector Motor Service, Inc v McLaughlin (1944) 323 US 101 
105 Ibid 
106 Ibid 
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5. 
 
Indicators of Legislative Intent 
The Role of Findings 
 Legislative intent is the policy goal of the enacting legislative coalition behind a 
particular statute.107 The primary role of statutory interpretation is the practical application of 
legislative purpose memorialized within the enactment.108 While central to statutory 
interpretation, structural characteristics of individual legislative bodies mean that a coherent 
legislative intent is only discernible in specific scenarios.  
 Behind a statute stands the ‘legislative bargain’- the mechanical logic behind our 
representatives’ agreement on an enacted text.109 For example, in the United Kingdom 
Parliament, legislation is controlled from drafting to Royal Assent by the Government of the 
day, with a majority in the House of Commons virtually ensuring passage of all Government 
bills.110 This is a powerful indicator of legislative intent, because the constitutional role of 
House of Commons is merely to approve or reject clearly defined policy objectives advocated 
by the Government in a bill.111 Conversely, Congress’ legislative bargain is exceedingly 
complex, with individual members and lobbyists drafting legislation, negotiating with 
colleagues and adapting provisions based on varying interests and an understanding of what 
is likely to garner enough support to pass. In that way, it is possible that discernible views of 
intent with regards to a particular act are as numerous as Members of Congress themselves, 
except when legislators explicitly enact provisions stating ‘this is what we mean.’ 
                                                          
107 Reed Dickerson, ‘Statutory Interpretation: ‘A Peek into the Mind and Will of a Legislature” (1974-1975) 50 
Indiana LJ 206 
108 Ibid 217; n 13, Frankfurter 
109 Alaska Airlines v Brock (1987) 480 US 685 
110 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Representative Lawmaking’ (2009) 89 Boston Univ LR 341 
111 Standing Orders of the House of Commons (House of Commons, 2012) 18; Standing Orders of the House of 
Lords (House of Lords, 2013) 17 
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Legislative findings are the exception to the rule that Congressional intent is hard to 
discern. Much like preambles, findings are factual conclusions found in statutory text that 
explains how the legislature determined that action was warranted, the policy issues 
addressed, the application of the statute to these goals, and, if necessary, constitutional 
authority.112 Appropriately, these sections are often entitled “Legislative Intent” or 
“Findings.” 113 No constitutional requirement obligates Congress to include findings in its 
work.114 In the aftermath of Gun-Free School Zones Act falling in Lopez however, Congress 
has taken the view that findings are a critical method of expressing legislative intent when 
considering legislation that might be subject to a constitutional challenge.115  
As discussed earlier, the Constitution establishes a narrow set of areas in which 
Congress can act.116 Enumeration, therefore, means that it is important for citizens, Congress, 
and the courts to be cognizant of the authority in which legislation purports to act. Findings 
make the relationship between enumeration and legislation explicit, tying real-world fact to 
legislative intent and statutory provisions to constitutional authority.117 Beginning after the 
2010 election, the House of Representatives began including constitutional authority 
statements with all bills and joint resolutions introduced in the House.118 Both findings and 
constitutional authority statements, while not constitutionally mandated, are important drivers 
of accountability and transparency, allowing citizens to better understand the actions their 
representatives are taking. This is a model of good legislative practice that needs to be more 
widely understood and continued. 
                                                          
112 Ann Seidman, Robert Seidman, and Nalin Abeyesekere, Legislative Drafting for Democratic Social Change 
(Kluwer 2001) 310; n 65 
113 n 2 
114 See generally, n 11 
115 n 65 
116 n 11 
117 Harold J Krent, ‘Turning Congress into an Agency: The Propriety of Requiring Legislative Findings’ (1995-
1996) 46 Case Western LR 736 
118 Richard E Cohen, ‘House GOP: Bills Will Have to Cite Constitution’ (Politico, December 17, 2010) 
<http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1210/46565.html> 
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Findings make statutory analysis much easier, allowing judges to skip the potentially 
perilous step of divining legislative direction and meaning, since these factors are plainly set 
out in the statutory text. This allows the judiciary to instead turn to whether the stated 
legislative intent and findings of fact are reconcilable with the enumerated powers doctrine 
and other constitutional elements. Consequently, when courts are faced with findings in 
statutory analysis, they essentially have two options.  
Most commonly, courts will accept the legislative findings and hold the legislation 
constitutional. Conversely, judicial analysis may accept the findings and intent, but find 
defects in the underlying constitutional authority and strike the legislation down. In either 
case, however, courts must accept findings as conclusive proof of legislative intent, as the 
findings have undergone the constitutionally prescribed method of bicameralism and 
presentment with the remainder of the enactment, and have been explicitly included by 
legislators to convey their purpose.119 This crucial concept represents the first defect in the 
Supreme Court’s holding of the Affordable Care Act’s minimum coverage provision as a tax. 
The Affordable Care Act’s Findings 
 Congress elected to include lengthy findings in the section immediately before the 
minimum coverage provision: 
“(a) Findings.- Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) In General. - The individual responsibility requirement provided for in this 
section (in this subsection referred to as the ‘requirement’) is commercial 
and economic in nature, and substantially affects interstate commerce, as 
a result of the effects described in paragraph (2). 
 
 
                                                          
119 John F Manning, ‘Textualism as a Non-Delegation Doctrine’ (1997) 97 Columbia LR 675; Bicameralism and 
presentment refers to the constitutional process of identical text being passed by both houses and presented to 
the President for action. 
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(2) Effects on the National Economy and Interstate Commerce.- The effects 
described in this paragraph are the following: 
(A) The requirement regulates activity that is commercial and 
economic in nature… 
(B) Health insurance and healthcare services are a significant part of 
the national economy. National health spending is projected to 
increase from $2,500,000,000,000, or 17.6 percent of the economy, in 
2009 to $4,700,000,000,000 in 2019. 
…  
(C) Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974…the 
Public Health Service Act…and this Act, the Federal Government has 
significant role in regulating health insurance which is in interstate 
commerce. 
… 
(3) Supreme Court Ruling.- In United States v. South Eastern Underwriters 
Association (322 U.S. 544 (1944)), the Supreme Court of the United States 
ruled that insurance is interstate commerce subject to Federal regulation.” 120 
More than a full page of the legislation is devoted toward detailed findings 
surrounding the country’s policy needs, the manner in which the Act will address healthcare 
challenges, and constitutional authority for the minimum coverage provision under the 
Commerce Clause.121 The statements go to great lengths to tie this authority to interstate 
commerce effects.122 The words/phrases “economic” or “interstate commerce” are cited 
fourteen times in the findings.123 No mention of taxation or revenue or any related provisions 
is present.124 References to the economic nature of a problem or interstate commerce echo the 
                                                          
120 n 2, §1501 
121 Ibid 
122 Ibid 
123 Ibid 
124 Ibid 
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enumerated powers doctrine, and based on other examples of legislation, are explicit 
statements of constitutional authority.125  
Importantly, in the final finding, Congress elected to forgo subtlety and make an 
unusually direct statement in anticipation of a constitutional challenge.126 United States v 
South-Eastern Underwriters Association is cited, noting that “the Supreme Court of the 
United States ruled that insurance is interstate commerce subject to Federal regulation.” This 
statement, combined with the other numerous references to interstate commerce found in 
these findings, underscores that Congress intended to enact the statute under its Commerce 
Clause power.127 
A number of references to “regulation” and “regulating” are also found in the 
Congressional findings, and in statements made by legislators, and the President (see 
following section).128 A regulation “is the act or process by controlling by rule or restriction,” 
establishing a standard of conduct. 129 Additionally, analysis of the construction of the statute 
tells us that the minimum coverage provision is located in Title I, the regulatory core of the 
Affordable Care Act.130 These findings and the provision itself (Note 53), demonstrate that 
Congress enacted the minimum coverage provision as a regulation, a policy tool inherently 
different from a tax. 
Legislative Materials and Statements 
 While seemingly dispositive, findings are not the only record of legislative intent that 
exists. Legislative materials are documents prepared by members of the legislature, or most 
frequently, their staff, as part of the enacting process.131 Legislative materials in Congress 
                                                          
125 n 11; See Violence Against Women Act, Public Law 103-322; Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 
1997, Public Law 104-208 
126 United States v South-Eastern Underwriters Association (1944) 322 US 533 
127 Ibid  
128 n 2, §1501 
129 Brian A Garner, ‘Regulation’ Black’s Law Dictionary (3rd Pocket Edn, Thomson-West, 2006) 604 
130 n 129; The Act’s tax provisions are located in Title IX. 
131 Stephane Beaulac, ‘Parliamentary Debates in Statutory Interpretation: A Question of Admissibility or of 
Weight?’ (1997-1998) 43 McGill LJ 289 
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include the Congressional Record, a verbatim transcript of legislators’ remarks in each house, 
a summary of floor action, and “Extensions of Remarks;” material placed in the Record by 
legislators, including speeches not given in the chambers, letters from constituents, 
newspaper articles, and other extraneous material related to legislative duties.132 Legislative 
materials can also include analytical policy reports issued by committees that have considered 
a bill.133 
 Absolute reliance on these legislative materials in Congress can be ill-advised as the 
nature of Congress’ legislative bargain renders them susceptible to influence by a small 
number of influential members, staffers, or lobbyists. Most importantly, having not been 
formally approved through the process of bicameralism and presentment, they are not binding 
statutory law.134 When taken with other more reliable indicators of legislative intent such as 
plain meaning and maxims of construction, however, they can nevertheless offer limited 
background insight into legislative intent. 
 The factual record of statements made by Members of Congress and the President, 
like the findings found in the text of the bill, are clear.135 Representative Louise Slaughter 
(Democrat, New York), Chairwoman of the ever-important House Rules Committee, stated 
during the Act’s final debate on March 21, 2010 that “the requirements in the bill are not 
unconstitutional,” citing the Act’s “substantial effect on interstate commerce, which includes 
buying and selling health insurance” as part of Congress’ power to regulate under the 
Commerce Clause.136 Even Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson (Republican, Texas), an 
opponent of the bill, noted the argument of the proponents: “I want to talk about another area 
                                                          
132 ‘About the Congressional Record’ in THOMAS, Library of Congress 
<http://thomas.loc.gov/home/abt.cong.rec.html> accessed 31 May 2013 
133 John F Manning, ‘Putting Legislative History to a Vote: A Response to Professor Siegel’ (2000) 53 
Vanderbilt LR 1529 
134 See generally, Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (Princeton, 1997) 
135 The President is a key player in the legislative process because of his constitutional veto authority. 
136 Congressional Record (March 21, 2010) H1826; The House Rules Committee is one of the most important 
bodies of the House in that it determines the legislative agenda, sets the terms of debate, and therefore has great 
authority in determining whether bills have the opportunity to be considered. 
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that I think is a stretch in this bill: apparently the individual mandate is being justified by the 
commerce clause of our Constitution…” 137 Senator Baucus also declared that “we have 
seriously looked at this question [constitutionality] as well and have concluded that the 
penalty in the bill is constitutional…those who study constitutional law as a line of 
work…argue forcefully that the requirement is within Congress’ power to regulate interstate 
commerce.” 138 Baucus briefly mentioned the potential applicability of the taxing power, but 
this was never echoed by another Representative or Senator, presumably because of the 
politically sensitive nature of calling something a tax.139 In this way, our examination of 
legislative materials and statements reinforces the conclusion that Congress intended the 
minimum coverage provision to be a Commerce Clause regulation. 
The Rejected Proposals 
The skill and care of the legislative draftsman has historically been the cause of much 
litigation.140 Is it possible that a drafting error is to blame for the minimum coverage 
controversy or that Congress considered any instrument that incentivized health insurance 
was an acceptable meaning of the Affordable Care Act, irrespective of the findings? As 
mentioned in Chapter Three, Congress considered many competing pieces of legislation 
before settling on the final act in March 2010.  
 
 
                                                          
137 Congressional Record (December 22, 2009) S13718 
138 Ibid S13766 
139 Ibid S13830 
140 A British jingle: “I am the Parliamentary draftsman, I make the laws. Of much of the country’s litigation, I 
am the cause.” 
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Each of following was introduced in the months leading up to the Act’s final passage, 
and all were sponsored by key players in the House and Senate leadership: 141  
x HR 3200, “America’s Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009”  
(Sponsored by Rep. Dingell, Chairman of the Energy & Commerce Committee 
and nine other Democrats) 
-“Sec. 59B. Tax on Individuals Without Acceptable Healthcare Coverage. 
(a) Tax Imposed.- In the case of any individual who does not meet the 
requirements of subsection (d)…there is hereby imposed a tax equal to 
2.5 percent…” 142  
x HR 3962, “Affordable Healthcare for America Act” 
(Sponsored by Rep. Dingell and six senior Democrats ) 
-“Sec. 59B. Tax on Individuals Without Acceptable Healthcare Coverage. 
(a) Tax Imposed.- In the case of any individual who does not meet the 
requirements of subsection (d)…there is hereby imposed a tax equal to 
2.5 percent…” 143 
x S.1796, “America’s Healthy Future Act of 2009” 
                                   (Sponsored by Sen. Baucus) 
                                -“Sec.5000A Failure to Maintain Essential Health Benefits Coverage. 
        (b) Imposition of Tax.- 
 (1) In General.- If an applicable individual fails to meet the   
requirement of subsection (a)…there is hereby imposed a tax with 
respect to the individual…” 144 
                                                          
141 Noting that each was sponsored by House or Senate leadership is evidence that these bills had a substantial 
likelihood of passage. 
142 n 39, HR 3200 
143 Ibid, HR 3962 
144 Ibid, S.1796 
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 HR 3962 was debated by the House on November 7, 2009 and passed 220-215.145 
Additionally, both House Bill 3200 and Senate Bill 1796 were both reported favorably by 
committees and sent to the floors of their respective chambers for consideration.146 The 
similarity of the language between these initial proposals is striking. S.1796 would have even 
created the same “§5000A” of the United States Code created in the version of the Act that 
finally became law. Each version of the minimum coverage provision in these bills imposed a 
tax, with Congress considering each at length and expressly declining to send them to the 
President, opting for HR 3590 as its vehicle for healthcare reform. 
Consider a thought experiment. You visit a car dealership. Sales have been brisk, and 
the salesman only has two cars left, one red and another blue. The red one instantly catches 
your eye and the salesman prepares a contract. At that moment, you realize that your 
significant other absolutely loathes the color red, and while red is your favorite color, you are 
not necessarily opposed to blue. Your pen above the signature line, you rip up the contract 
and tell the sales representative that you have decided on the blue car instead. The contract is 
executed, and you drive your new blue car home. Consequently, which car did you buy? The 
red model you initially favored, but ultimately decided against or the blue car memorialized 
in the contract and now sitting in your driveway? The blue model is the answer most would 
quickly arrive at. 
This conclusion of this illustration is common sense. Indeed, the concept of choosing 
one object, and then opting for another, was previously a fundamental statutory interpretive 
method that placed appropriate weight on legislative choice. “Few principles of statutory 
construction are more compelling than the proposition that Congress does not intend sub 
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silentio [meaning ‘under’ or ‘in silence’] to enact statutory language that it has earlier 
discarded in favor of other language.” 147 As shown earlier, Congress considered versions of 
the minimum coverage provision drafted as a tax and discarded each of them in favor of the 
enacted statute. Affirming this doctrine, the Supreme Court, through volumes of precedent, 
has historically reasoned that statutory analysis “strongly militates against a judgment that 
Congress intended a result that it expressly declined to enact.” 148 
The expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon of statutory interpretation is also 
illustrative.149 This canon, “one of the most important rules in the construction of statutes,” 
holds that the expression of one idea or object (penalty) means the exclusion of other similar 
objects (tax).150 This time-tested principle was even recently reaffirmed by the Supreme 
Court in Marx v General Revenue Corporation (2013), stating “the expressio unius canon 
that they invoke does not apply ‘unless it is fair to suppose that Congress considered the 
unnamed possibility and meant to say no to it.’” 151 In our case, Congress did consider the 
possibility (tax) in both chambers, and explicitly rejected it each time. This canon should 
have also been controlling in the Court’s statutory analysis, analyzing the Act in the plain 
language in which it is drafted. As a result, consideration of the proposals which Congress 
considered, but eventually declined to enact establishes that Congress’ legislative intent in the 
Affordable Care Act and the Supreme Court’s holding of the minimum coverage provision as 
a tax are not reconcilable. 
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Abrogation of Legislative Intent 
 As previously discussed, the primary function of statutory interpretation is to give 
effect to the legislative enactment.152 Through analysis of the legislative findings 
memorialized by Congress in the Affordable Care Act, it is clear that Congress intended that 
the minimum coverage provision stand as a Commerce Clause regulation and penalty, on the 
basis of numerous references to economic factors, interstate commerce, and citation of 
Supreme Court precedent subjecting health insurance to Federal regulation. The uses of the 
word regulate, or a variation, in the findings and the text of the regulation, strengthen this 
conclusion. Legislative materials and statements, speeches made by Members of Congress, 
also provide important evidence that these legislative actors understood the minimum 
coverage provision to be a regulation. Additionally, the rejected proposals Congress 
considered before settling on the text of the final enactment clearly establishes that legislators 
had considered the option of drafting the provision as a tax, and rejected it on numerous 
occasions. 
 Statutory interpretation is “the hold of a particular statute law upon a court… 
conceived as beginning and ending with the particular precepts through which it is expressed 
by the legislature.” 153 In this way, courts are bound by statutes in much the same way that 
citizens must adhere to the text of the legislative enactment. The Supreme Court, through 
Chief Justice Roberts’ reasoning, departed from this duty and well-established precedent to 
stay faithful to the words Congress actually said and the intent that lay behind the legislative 
text. While the Supreme Court is permitted to establish a new precedent allowing it to depart 
from the statutory text in this way, doing so departs from the central role that separation of 
powers plays in balancing our constitutional forces. 
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      6. 
The Separation of Powers 
The Boundary of Legislative Policies 
 Legislative authority is defined as “the right and duty to determine the subject, 
character, and extent of governmental regulations…to proscribe at least in definite general 
terms what offices shall exist, what burdens shall be imposed, what rules of conduct and 
procedure shall be observed…” 154 Similarly, courts must construe and apply legislative 
statutes, in addition to other adjudicatory roles, “sifting through the evidence before it, and 
declaring what it found to be Congress’ intent.” 155 Only the legislature has the ability to 
make new policy choices and bind citizens with statutory law.156 Legislators, relying on their 
experience and constituents’ views, make the policy decision to turn left or right when our 
nation faces a fork in the road. Congress, however, cannot be reasonably expected to produce 
statutes covering every hypothetical scenario that could arise at some unknown point in the 
future.  They fill in specific detail where needed, laying out a roadmap through signals of 
legislative intent, enabling the executive and judiciary to fulfill their fiduciary constitutional 
roles by applying and interpreting the law. 
 Consequently, statutory interpretation must inevitably involve some limited manner of 
discretion. Consider for example, the classic “no vehicles in the park” illustration.157 Does 
this hypothetical statute prohibit cars, bicycles, or even toy cars? It is not unreasonable to say, 
literally, that each of these could fall under this requirement. This is because the statute is 
ambiguous in the scope of the policy expressed. A reasonable judge could arrive at any of 
these conclusions and still remain within the expressed legislative intent.  
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The important relationship in this example is that interpretation of a provision always 
has an outer boundary, in this case everything that could be reasonably construed as a 
vehicle. This outer boundary is “conceived as beginning and ending with…particular 
precepts” in the findings, goals, policy instruments, and construction of a statute.158 This 
demarcation, reflective of legislative intent, establishes the range of interpretations that could 
be reasonably viewed as possible within the text of the enactment. Without an outer 
boundary, there would be no need for formal statutes. Legislators could instead pass a one-
sentence bill signifying its approval of the other two branches’ authority to take action to 
improve our roads, for example, delegating an unlimited level of authority to solve the issue 
in whatever manner other governmental actors feel is appropriate. The rule of law, our 
republican form of government, and our representative democracy make this action an 
impossibility, however. 
 If statutory language is ambiguous and offers no other evidence in the manner of the 
vehicles example, then anything that could be reasonably construed is arguably within the 
boundary of the enacted policy. Perhaps Congress is even aware of this. In making necessary 
decisions that cannot garner legislative consensus, our Members of Congress may sometimes 
opt to allow courts to define the parameters of a policy by passing hopelessly ambiguous 
legislation, which at a minimum allows our representatives to show to their constituents that 
action has been taken. 
In this way, ambiguous provisions will inevitably arise. If Congress is ambiguous, 
judges have additional discretion to reasonably develop the policy within the statute. This 
should not be the goal, however, as good legislation is clear, accessible to everyone, and 
straightforward in its intent, laying out a logical roadmap from problem to solution and 
expected results. However, when legislatures are specific, and have clearly established a 
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policy boundary with the words employed in the text, these frontiers must be respected. No 
one could seriously argue, for example, that the vehicles example prohibits tires in the park. 
For courts to interpret otherwise would represent impermissible judicial revision.  
A Judicial ‘Fix’ 
Jurists have warned against this danger for many years. In United States v. Butler 
(1936), Justice Robert stated the function of the judiciary in reconciling statutes with the 
Constitution: 
“There should be no misunderstanding as to the function of this Court…all legislation 
must conform to the principles it lays down…When an act of Congress is 
appropriately challenged in the courts as not conforming to the constitutional 
mandate, the judicial branch of the government has only one duty, -to lay the article 
of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to 
decide whether the latter squares with the former.” 159 
Justice Harlan, in Scales v United States (1960) reminds the judiciary that “although 
this Court will often strain to construe legislation so as to save it against constitutional attack, 
it must not and will not carry this to the point of perverting the purpose of a statute.” 160  The 
Supreme Court has previously underscored that “the framers of the Constitution were not 
mere visionaries toying with speculations or theories, but practical men; dealing with the 
facts of political life…prescribing in language clear and intelligible the powers that 
government was to take.” 161 In that way, the Founders were one of the first proponents of the 
plain language movement in legislative drafting that is budding today.162 Confusingly, in the 
NFIB decision, Chief Justice Roberts, before holding the minimum coverage provision as a 
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tax, cites this text and seemingly emphasizes its importance, which contrasts greatly later 
with the tax holding.163  
Affirming these important principles, courts must construct a statute “without doing 
violence to the fair meaning of the words used.” 164 In that way, the judiciary is constraining 
itself- emphasizing that it must remain within the policy boundary established by Congress in 
legislation. It was previously a fundamental truth that “under our constitutional framework, 
federal courts do not sit as councils of revision, empowered to rewrite legislation.” 165 
Consider the totality of enacted text, findings, legislative materials, and rejected proposals as 
evidence of the overall nature of the minimum coverage provision. It cannot be reasonably 
said that the holding of this provision as a tax fails to do “violence to the fair meaning of the 
words used” by Congress and in doing so “requires rewriting, not just reinterpretation.” 166 
While intended as a “fix” to allow healthcare reform to go forward, perhaps placing emphasis 
on political concerns, this decision instead prevails today as a fundamentally original 
statutory revision external to the separation of powers. 
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The Nature of Separated Powers 
Separation of powers is the delegated system of administrative, legislative, and 
adjudicatory functions among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches at both the 
national and state level.167  This tripartite division of power was first devised by Montesquieu 
in his seminal work The Spirit of the Laws (1748).168 Building upon Montesquieu’s concept, 
the Founders’ fear that liberty could be threatened by concentration of authority in the hands 
of a single branch, much like in 18th century Great Britain, led to the adoption of a system of 
separated powers.169 Separation of powers exists “as a bulwark against tyranny…For if 
governmental power is fractionalized, if a given policy can only be implemented only by a 
combination of legislative enactment, judicial application, and executive implementation, no 
man or group of men will be able to impose its unchecked will.” 170  
Separation of powers was not implemented with government efficiency in mind, 
instead affirming the notion that the Federal government was one of limited powers, 
emphasizing the prerogatives of the states and important individual protections.171 This 
understanding contrasts distinctly with the United Kingdom, i.e. before the removal of the 
House of Lords’ appellate jurisdiction in 2005, separation of powers did not formally exist.172 
Continuing to develop today, Britain’s doctrine can best be defined as “separate institutions 
sharing powers” as a result of parliamentary sovereignty, with executive agencies and many 
quasi-governmental agencies exercising adjudicatory discretion, with the executive wielding 
a great deal of influence over Parliament and most government ministers being drawn from 
the House of Commons.173  
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Judicial Revision is an Improper Assumption of Congress’ Legislative Power 
Congress’ ability to set the policymaking agenda and control appropriations means 
that it is the central actor of government. Article I establishes that “All legislative Powers 
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.” 174 The mandated system 
of bicameralism and presentment is the exclusive means of crafting the “Laws of the United 
States.” 175 Congress, consequently, has absolute and sole authority to make the policy 
decisions that require statutory law and to place those provisions onto the statute book. 
Congress chooses, from time to time, to delegate a limited fraction of  lawmaking authority 
needed to implement statutes to the executive, but this delegation must be limited and 
legislators must expressly enable this rule-making authority.176  
Beyond this, Congress may not transfer primary legislative authority to another 
branch, in the same way that other branches cannot constitutionally substitute their functions 
or assume powers constitutionally delegated to other branches. This inability is called the 
non-delegation doctrine.177 Thus, in much the same way as the separation of powers, the non-
delegation doctrine is “a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or 
aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of another.” 178 The ability of the judiciary to 
“sit as a council of revision” or redraft congressional statutes impermissibly encroaches on 
Congress’ legislative authority.179 Beyond this essential justification, good policymaking 
demands that power to legislative and revise remain with Congress. 
Policymaking 
 Penalties and taxes are fundamentally different policy instruments. A penalty is “an 
exaction imposed by statute as punishment for an unlawful act,” and is fundamentally 
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regulatory in the sense that it proscribes conduct and establishes punishment for transgressing 
an established standard.180 A penalty can have a scienter requirement, or can be an absolute-
liability offense, where simply committing the act is sufficient.181 Conversely, “a tax is an 
enforced contribution to provide for the support of government,” that also can incentivize, but 
not require conduct. 182  Taxes can be used to incentivize certain conduct, but not to formally 
prohibit.183 Consequently, penalties establish a standard to be obeyed, with taxes supporting 
government operations and incentivizing conduct as a secondary function. However, the 
Child Labor Tax Cases note that, 
“where the sovereign enacting the law has the power to impose both tax and 
penalty, the difference between revenue production and mere regulation may 
be immaterial, but not so when one sovereign can impose a tax only, and the 
power of regulation rests in another.” 184 
This case and the historic annals of Congressional legislation remind us of the 
common sense principle that penalties and taxes are separate instruments of the legislative 
process.185 As distinct tools of the policy process, Congress must consider varying 
consequences including drafting style and phrasing, definitions of conduct, knowledge of 
guilt, proportionality, and methods of enforcement and collection in choosing between these 
instruments. Separate constitutional grants of Congressional taxing powers in Art. I, §VIII, 
Cl. I, and regulatory power in Cl. III also evidence this choice. As a result, policymaking is a 
difficult and specialized process. The judiciary is hardly qualified for this task since they 
have criminal, civil, bankruptcy, immigration, and countless other cases to adjudicate, and 
little experience with the nature of the legislative bargain (Notes 112-114). Members of 
Congress, on the other hand, exclusively spend their time studying the country’s policy 
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needs, listening to constituents, hearing expert testimony, and mastering the nuance of the 
legislative process, supported by subject-matter experts in areas of policy. In this way, the 
idea of allowing the judiciary “to rewrite the statutory scheme in order to approximate what it 
thinks Congress might have wanted had it known…[a provision] was beyond its authority” 
ignores the truism that the judiciary is simply less than qualified to make effective policy 
decisions.186 
 The precedent set by the Supreme Court in revising the minimum coverage provision 
encourages Congress to also place little emphasis on effective legislative drafting. If 
legislators know that the likelihood of their policy preferences being translated into their 
desired outcomes is not tied to the quality of their draft, Congress will inevitably place less 
emphasis on it, transferring the role of legislative drafting de facto to the courts, dramatically 
increasing their workload, and in effect making them the primary arbiter of legislative detail. 
Noting this inevitable result, the Supreme Court noted that “if we allowed a legislature to 
correct its mistakes without paying for them (beyond the inconvenience of passing a new 
law), we would decrease the legislature's incentive to draft a narrowly tailored law in the first 
place.” 187 This trend could even theoretically continue  until, as discussed earlier, legislatures 
simply pass a broad statement of intention requiring that “action be taken” to address a 
particular policy problem, leaving it to the executive to exercise broad discretion in 
fashioning a policy, and allowing the courts to establish the policy boundaries of the initial 
enabling act. At that point, the idea of having one legislative branch and the whole notion of 
separation of powers becomes a myth. 
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Congress Is “the Decider” 
President George W. Bush famously remarked in 2006 that he is “the decider.” 188  
Congress is the great ‘decider,’ however, when it comes to transforming policy goals into 
binding law. In our republican form of government, legislators are accountable for their 
choices, understanding that “all authority flows from and returns at stated periods to, the 
people.” 189 Therefore, Congress’ fundamental authority to make political decisions, such as 
choosing between a penalty and a tax, is enabled by this accountability- legislators will make 
the decision most responsive to their constituents’ wishes, and if they fail to do so, they can 
be held accountable at the next election, never more than two or six years away.190 
Consequently, Congress’ ability to decide between policy alternatives and frame those 
alternatives via the language it employs is its only effective method of communicating the 
actions it has taken. Legislators have no greater charge, and will ultimately be held 
accountable for the way in which they exercise this solemn responsibility. 
Legislators must reconcile broadly diverging political viewpoints in the midst of 
forming “a more perfect Union,” promoting “the general Welfare,” and securing “the 
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.” 191 In this way, Congress must make 
hard choices between competing legislative proposals, interest groups, constituents’ wishes 
and electoral concerns, often reflecting politically charged viewpoints about how a problem 
should be addressed.   
It is doubtless true that for many, the imposition of a tax means something different in 
their political value judgments than compliance with a regulatory penalty, because 
individuals make different value judgments on the role of government. Congress gauges 
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support for policy alternatives based on these factors and is uniquely qualified to do so 
because they are periodically accountable to their constituents. In this way, the Supreme 
Court’s revision of the Affordable Care Act fatally interrupts that accountability.  
The Court’s actions impose a policy alternative that legislators disagreed vehemently 
on from the beginning, leaving them in the awkward position of having to defend themselves 
before their constituents for imposing a tax they thought they would never be held 
accountable for and which failed to pass.192 Congress’ framing of the individual mandate as a 
regulatory penalty was doubtless a political judgment that their constituents would refuse to 
accept a tax, not wanting to be liable for the politically sensitive charge that they were 
imposing a tax increase, viewing that they could suffer electoral consequences. This perhaps 
explains the shift from tax to penalty in the draft Affordable Care Act versions discussed 
earlier. 
In the same light, President Obama went to extraordinary lengths to deny that the 
individual mandate was a tax- before the Court’s decision in NFIB v Sebelius and after- even 
going to the remarkable length of disputing the Court’s holding.193 The Republican Party, 
especially Presidential candidate Mitt Romney, also went to great lengths to exploit the 
Court’s NFIB ruling in the months leading up to the 2012 election, emphasizing that "the 
American people know that President Obama has broken the pledge he made; he said he 
wouldn't raise taxes on middle-income Americans.” 194 Similarly, Governor Bobby Jindal 
(Republican, Louisiana), speaking on behalf of Romney, noted, “You know what's interesting 
is throughout the process by this there are promises made by the president, Nancy Pelosi, and 
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others, saying 'Oh no, we're not going to tax people.'” 195 The group “Americans For 
Prosperity” launched a $9 million advertising campaign in the days after the ruling, 
commenting that “The Supreme Court’s ruled and President Obama’s now given us one of 
the biggest tax increases in history...we’re going to remind people.” 196  
Tax policy is among the most fundamental policy decisions that government 
makes.197 The Constitution envisions, resulting from the Framers’ difficulties in raising funds 
during the Revolutionary War and later under the Articles of Confederation, that our 
government today must have a redoubtable, effective funding mechanism. However, as the 
United States was born of a tax revolt, the drafters of our constitutional framework 
understood that this effective mechanism must also be both accountable and responsive. 
Article I, §VII places the sole right to originate tax legislation in the House of 
Representatives.198 As a result, the Constitution emphasized that the individuals responsible 
for creating tax policy would be subject to the highest standard of accountability of any office 
in the Federal government- election every two years. Above and beyond constitutional 
authority, the Origination Clause underscores the fact the revising legislation from the bench 
undercuts accountability in our representative democracy.  
As Chief Justice Roberts himself admitted, the tax argument is not “the most natural 
interpretation of the mandate.” 199 Courts should give greater deference to tax provisions in 
statutory interpretation because of Congress’ fundamental accountability to the public and 
because of the political consequences of expropriation.200 To redraft a statute and impose a 
politically sensitive tax is to assign motives that the Constitution places great weight on and 
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which itself Congress weighs in excruciating detail before enactment. Through revising the 
minimum coverage provision, the Court has inappropriately injected political instability into 
the accountability relationship, making political actors responsible for a policy in which they 
never intended to be held accountable for. This is the cornerstone of why courts should not do 
“violence to the fair meaning of the words used” by Congress. It interrupts the important 
chain of accountability between legislator and citizen and impermissibly exercises Congress’ 
Article I powers. That is why judicial review exists- to consider what Congress has actually 
done, not what it could have done but chose not to do, unafraid to return defective legislation 
back to the branch that is most qualified and accountable in assessing the desires and needs of 
the people of our United States and constitutionally charged with this task. 
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7. 
Conclusion 
 Responding to Alice’s comment of “whether you can make words mean so many 
different things,” Humpty cogently observed that the real question was simply which was to 
be master.201 Constitutionally, Congress is required to be the master of statutory law in 
devising, considering, and translating policy goals into legal requirements. However, in 
National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius, the United States Supreme Court 
exercised a power of revision that abrogated Congress’ intent and placed at risk Congress’ 
legislative authority under the separation of powers. 
This work began by discussing the policy setting of healthcare reform, establishing 
the background in which Congress chose to act in 2009-2010 and the legislative history of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Litigation surrounding the mandate to carry 
health insurance was quickly heard in Federal courts, challenging the constitutionality of 
Congress’ intent to enact the minimum coverage provision as a Commerce Clause regulation. 
Finding this intent an impermissible stretch of Congress’ enumerated Article I powers, the 
Supreme Court instead searched for an alternative method in which to allow healthcare 
reform to go forward. Citing numerous tangential elements, the Court stated that it was 
possible that the minimum coverage provision could be read as a tax, and in a split decision, 
opted to uphold its constitutionality on those grounds. 
Noting that legislative intent is the policy goal of legislators, and that primary role of 
statutory interpretation is the practical application of the legislative intent, the Court failed to 
place appropriate weight on Congressional findings, legislative materials, and previous 
versions of the legislation which were rejected. Each of these facets, long-recognized by the 
judiciary in statutory analysis, gives a dispositive indication that Congress intended the 
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minimum coverage provision to be a Commerce Clause regulation enforced by penalty. Even 
ceding that “the most straightforward reading of the mandate is that it commands,” the Court 
impermissibly revised the statute to stand as a tax, an option previously considered and 
expressly discarded by Congress.202 
Judicial revision is foreign to our separation of powers jurisprudence. In revising the 
statute, the Court has challenged our notion of separation of powers and Congress’ role 
within it. Clearly delineated areas of authority are necessary and beneficial since Congress 
only has significant expertise in policymaking decisions and extensive experience weighing 
political factors. Accountability is the foundation that underscores this crucial power. 
Congress, in exchange for the ability to chart the course of government, is held accountable 
regularly for the consequences of its choices. It is inappropriate for the judiciary to interpose 
itself in these processes in by exercising a revisionary power. 
The Constitution has established that our legislative process is the political means by 
which we make policy decisions that inevitably engender passion and disagreement. The 
judicial power to revise statutes, as seen in the Affordable Care Act, is external to this 
process. This is not to say that healthcare reform is not vitally important, or that imposing a 
tax to incentivize health insurance coverage is the wrong policy way to achieve this.203 The 
central truth, however, is that in the rush to make a difference for those suffering an inability 
to access healthcare, we have taken the first step toward undercutting the solid constitutional 
framework that our country rests upon. 
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 Chief Justice Taft, in the Child Labor Tax Cases, notes: 
“The good sought in unconstitutional legislation is an insidious feature, because it 
leads citizens and legislators of good purpose to promote it, without thought of the 
serious breach it will make in the ark of our covenant…” 204 
As a key feature in our national “ark”, the separation of powers insures that plenary 
government authority cannot exist, and that no faction of government can aggrandize itself at 
the expense of transitory concerns and individual discretion. The revision of the Affordable 
Care Act has weakened this crucial bulwark.  
Though facially unconstitutional as drafted, it was simply the Court’s duty to judge it 
so and return it to the organ of government best prepared to formulate an alternative proposal 
that meets our nation’s urgent healthcare needs. Statutory interpretation, at its core, is rooted 
in giving essence and effect to what our legislators have done. If established, a doctrine 
allowing courts to revise defective legislation would represent the reduction of the separation 
of powers to symbolic form, mortally lessening the value of Congress’ enactments. We have 
taken a step in that direction. Let us now quickly take a step back. 
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